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Abstract—The academic study of flow-based malware 
detection has primarily focused on NetFlow v5 and v9. In 2013 
IPFIX was ratified as the flow export standard. As part of a larger 
project to develop protection methods for Cloud Service Providers 
from botnet threats, this paper considers the challenges involved 
in designing an open source IPFIX based botnet detection 
function. This paper describes how these challenges were 
overcome and presents an open source system built upon Xen 
hypervisor and Open vSwitch that is able to display botnet traffic 
within Cloud Service Provider-style virtualised environments. The 
system utilises Euler property graphs to display suspect 
“botnests”. The conceptual framework presented provides a 
vendor-neutral, real-time detection mechanism for monitoring 
botnet communication traffic within cloud architectures and the 
Internet of Things. 
Keywords—IPFIX; Cloud Detection System; Botnets; Property 
Graphs 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) style environments 
provide a low cost, scalable environment from which to host 
botnets. Botnets have been hosted from within Dropbox [1] and 
Amazon AWS [2]. Furthermore, IaaS provides a botmaster with 
a controllable environment. As the botmaster owns this 
environment, anti-malware detection can be removed and the 
bot hosted safe in the knowledge it is not going to be detected. 
This infected environment can then be rapidly cloned to create a 
sizeable botnet. Where a Command and Control (C&C) server 
is hosted in a cloud virtual environment, should the server be 
detected, the cloud makes it easy to spin up a new C&C server 
elsewhere. A botnet hosted within a cloud service provider 
(CSP) has the option to either attack a target within the Internet, 
or turn its focus internally and attack the cloud itself; where 
potential internal targets include other cloud tenants, or the cloud 
infrastructure such as storage repositories. Malware has been 
discovered in the wild with the ability to escape from virtualised 
hosts [3] and virtualised guest machines [4] [17], thereby 
possessing the ability to propagate across a virtual environment. 
Crisis malware [3] was the first malware discovered to 
specifically attack virtualised environments, such as those that 
will make up the Internet of Things (IoT). 
Packet capture malware detection methods, such as anti-
virus software or Intrusion Protection Systems, can present 
issues for CSPs. Traffic measurement on high speed links 
requires expensive, powerful, often dedicated devices capable of 
performing fast packet-processing functions distributed across 
multiple network locations. Packet capture detection relies on 
payload inspection to determine the presence of malware. 
Within CSPs this intrusive method can impact the privacy 
requirements of tenant data. Additionally, in order to take down 
a botnet, the C&C server must be identified and eradicated; 
something anti-virus software is not yet capable of doing. Flow 
monitoring has become the prevalent method for passive traffic 
monitoring in high-speed networks [5]. In 2013, almost 80% of 
ISP and network operators surveyed had technology in their 
network that is capable of capturing flow [6]. NetFlow v5 and 
v9 being the most common implementations of flow. To date, 
NetFlow has been vendor proprietary. With each vendor’s 
variant of NetFlow being slightly different, most flow export 
installations have been restricted to single vendor platforms. 
IPFIX was ratified in 2013 (RFC 7011 – RFC 7015) as the 
standard for flow export. Whilst IPFIX is built upon NetFlow 
v9, IPFIX can be considered a protocol in its own right, 
developed to address some of the drawbacks of NetFlow (see 
section II), such as the protocol’s lack of security. As well as 
being standards based, IPFIX offers other advantages over 
NetFlow which may be useful for botnet detections; such as 
customisable templates through Information Elements, built-in 
IPv6 specifications and bi-directional flows.   
As part of a larger project to construct an eco-system for 
botnet neutralisation within cloud environments such as the IoT, 
this paper describes the building of the data collection element 
of the eco-system.  
The criteria for this collection element is: 
 it must replicate the virtualised environments found 
within clouds providers who might host IoT-style 
applications; 
 it should be built upon currently available open source 
solutions wherever possible, in order to allow future 
software developmental contributions; 
 it will feed into a (planned) analysis neural network; 
which has the functionality for determining malicious 
traffic from benign traffic and quarantining infected 
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virtual machines (VMs); either by diverting flow 
communications based on Software Defined Network 
(SDN) architecture, or through automatic relocation and 
isolation of the infected machine [7]; 
 it should support both NetFlow and IPFIX export, to 
permit the academic comparison of both protocols in 
botnet detection. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
II of this paper reviews some of the limitations of NetFlow when 
used as the principal protocol to collect botnet communication 
traffic, and how IPFIX is designed to overcome these. Section 
III explains the conceptual design behind the novel detection 
methods presented within this paper, with section IV describing 
the flow monitoring architecture constructed from this design. 
Section V describes some of the issues encountered whilst 
building the environment and demonstrates the output of the 
built system. Section VI considers some of the limitations of 
flow-based detection. Finally, section VI reflects on what was 
learnt from this experience and how the proposed framework 
contributes towards protecting the IoT. 
II. NETFLOW AND IPFIX 
In the late 1980s Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) was the standard for network management. SNMP was 
designed to give basic information on a device status such as 
up/down status and common error alerts. The information 
available via SNMP was somewhat limited, so syslog was often 
used alongside SNMP to provide more granular and detailed 
event information. Unlike SNMP which pulls information off a 
device, syslog is a push technology which means devices send 
information without being polled. This makes syslog ideal for 
logging information about devices, but its unstructured data 
format makes it slow for querying and reporting. Today, flow 
export protocols send the same types of data as SNMP traps and 
syslog, with the advantages that flow export is a push technology 
which reports highly structured information that is ideal for 
reporting and querying. The IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force) first published the idea of aggregating packets into flows 
using packet header information for Internet accounting back in 
1991, but this work group was disbanded in 1993 due to a lack 
of vendor interest. In 1996, Cisco patented a technology based 
on flow export [8]. In 2002, Cisco released their first 
commercially available version of this flow export – NetFlow 
v5. With the release of NetFlow v9 (or Flexible NetFlow) Cisco 
enhanced NetFlow v5 with support for templates, IPv6, MLPS 
and VLANs. But NetFlow has some limitations. In 2008 the 
IETF proposed to create a standard to address these 
shortcomings. In 2013, the IPFIX standard was ratified as RFC 
7011 – RFC 7015 [9] with some improvements over NetFlow. 
A. Template Extensions 
Although NetFlow v5 and v9 are the most common 
implementations of flow today, there is no support for any 
extensions in the template set which allow new field types to be 
created as needed. Sometimes threat detection needs to 
understand information that is not available in the NetFlow v9 
template. IPFIX was designed as an extensible data model to be 
used in network security applications with flexibility and 
customisation front of mind. NetFlow v5 has a fixed template of 
18 fields, which confines the NetFlow v5 PDU to 48 bytes. RFC 
3954 [10] defines 79 fields that are available in NetFlow v9. 
Cisco’s version of NetFlow v9 defines 104 fields, however these 
are proprietary and will not necessarily interoperate with other 
vendor’s definition of NetFlow v9. IPFIX enterprise elements 
can be used to gain more information about flows by introducing 
new field types, known as Information Elements (IE). RFC7012 
[11] does not define the IEs, but states that IANA is responsible 
for maintaining Private Enterprise Numbers for defining the 
enterprise elements. IANA recognises 433 official fields in the 
IPFIX standard, with fields 433 - 32767 available for vendor 
specific assignment. IPFIX allows a vendor to export whatever 
layer 2 to layer 7 information they want in a standardised 
template compatible between vendors. Support of enterprise 
elements will mean IPFIX will be superior to NetFlow in next 
generation network monitoring, supporting higher performance 
for collection and use in analysis tools [12]. IPFIX also allows 
for variable length fields. NetFlow can achieve similar but with 
fixed columns sizes, which usually ends up with wasted space 
with every flow thereby increasing storage requirements [13].  
B. Transport Protocol 
The default transport protocol for NetFlow v9 is UDP [10]. 
Unlike TCP, UDP is not reliable, secure or congestion aware. 
This can lead to UDP flooding when a device is down or 
experiencing a DDoS attack. Additionally, transmitting flow 
statistics from the observation point over unreliable UDP can 
induce loss of measured data. IPFIX allows the transport 
protocol to be selected from SCTP (Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol), TCP or UDP. SCTP is congestion 
aware and is the recommended transport protocol as SCTP 
allows graceful degradation by selectively dropping exported 
datagrams under high load rather than overloading buffers. 
Additionally, SCTP mandates a cookie-exchange mechanism 
designed to defend against DoS attacks [9]. SCTP can be 
difficult to transmit over the Internet as some devices will drop 
these packets due to unrecognised protocol numbers, hence 
IPFIX supports TCP and binds well to TLS for secure transport, 
especially over the Internet. Cisco’s NetFlow v9 also allow for 
SCTP support to provide TCP like sequential packet delivery 
reliability and congestion awareness over UDP.  
C. Bi-directional Flow 
NetFlow defines a flow as a uni-directional sequence of 
packets with some common properties that pass through a 
network device [10]. RFC 5103 [14] allows IPFIX to be 
extended for the many applications where flow analysis benefits 
from associating the upstream with the downstream flows of a 
bi-directional communication. This is particularly useful for 
separating unanswered from answered TCP requests, such as 
when a botnet is searching for a peer that is offline. Bi-flow can 
also determine which party initiated the conversation, which 
may be useful when studying P2P traffic. 
D.  Security 
When NetFlow was designed it was believed that flow 
records would be confined to private networks, with collectors 
and exporters in close proximity. Hence, NetFlow did not 
impose confidentiality, integrity or authentication requirements 
on the protocol as this reduced the efficiency of the 
implementation [10]. This leaves NetFlow v5 and v9 open to 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks, packet tampering, packet forgery 
and attacks on the collector. IPFIX implementations must 
address confidentiality, integrity and authentication; including 
data obfuscation, for example, through encryption (as outlined 
in RFC 7011 [9] section 11). 
 THE JOURNAL ON CYBERCRIME & DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS, VOL. 1, NO. 1, DEC. 2015, BOTCONF 2015 PROCEEDINGS 
 
M. Graham, A. Winckles, E. Sanchez-Velazquez, IPFIX Based Open Source Botnet Detector (numbering of pages to be confirmed) 
E.  Next Generation Networking 
NetFlow has a fixed key structure that lacks the ability to 
monitor more complex network protocols such as IPv6, MPLS 
and multi-cast [15]. NetFlow v5 and many non-Cisco NetFlow 
v9 vendors do not support IPv6, whilst IPFIX and Cisco’s 
NetFlow v9 do. IPFIX was chosen over NetFlow v9 when 
looking at anomalous traffic in IPv6 flows [15], as the ease of 
extending IPFIX to include additional Information Elements 
allowed the design of new templates for detecting ICMPv6-DoS 
attacks, IPv6 extension headers and monitoring IPv6-over-IPv4 
tunnelling.  
F. Vendor Neutrality 
NetFlow comes in many flavours; Cisco’s NetFlow, 
Juniper’s JFlow, Alcatel-Lucent’s CFlow, Citrix’s AppFlow and 
Huawei’s NetStream, to name but a few.  Some vendors adhere 
to the NetFlow v5 structure, others adhere to a NetFlow v9’s 
structure. Cisco further extends NetFlow v9 with their own 
propriety solutions. As a ratified standard IPFIX allows 
interoperability between vendors. This is especially important 
when defining additional IEs for advanced flow-based 
monitoring systems. 
III. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
The criteria for the built detection element was outlined in 
section II:  
1) Replicating cloud provider virtualised environments 
The system design has to incorporate two principles of CSP 
design: a) tenant isolation and b) tenant privacy. To achieve 
tenant isolation CSPs utilise virtualised infrastructures which 
additionally reduces the hardware footprint whilst increasing 
equipment utilisation. The three most common hypervisor 
platforms amongst CSP are Citrix’s Xen, Microsoft’s Hyper-V 
and VMware’s ESXi. Of these Xen Hypervisor is open source. 
Xen is also very common amongst CSPs and is used by Amazon 
AWS, OpenStack and Apache’s Cloudstack. Xen, Hyper-V 
server and ESXi are all bare-metal hypervisors which boot 
directly from BIOS without additional operating system 
requirements between them and the hardware. Xen also offers 
para-virtualisation. Whilst full HVM (Hardware-assisted 
Virtualised Machine) more closely resembles the complete 
hardware isolation of a physical server, CSPs, like Amazon, tend 
to run para-virtualisation as it is faster when running on Linux 
OS. 
Signature-based packet capture techniques, as used in anti-
virus software and Intrusion Detection Systems, rely on packet 
payload inspection to detect malware. Packet inspection in CSP 
networks is not an option as it jeopardises tenant privacy 
requirements. Additionally, forensic detection techniques such 
as anti-virus serve to protect an individual host (or network) 
through disinfection. Botnet elimination requires that the C&C 
server(s) must be detected and taken down. This is not possible 
through forensic techniques, making traffic-based techniques 
more suited to botnet detection systems. Traffic monitoring 
using PCAP captures both traffic header information and 
payload, thereby beaching the privacy requirement. Flow export 
captures only packet header information, thereby retaining 
tenant privacy. 
2) Open Source 
Already mentioned is the desire to use open source 
equipment wherever possible as future software will need to be 
written to ensure interoperability between each element in the 
overall neutralisation eco-system. 
3) Feed into a Botnet Analysis and Recognition AI 
The detection test bed will be used to capture network traffic 
which will undergo a pre-processing function (such as filtering 
and correlation) before being passed onto a neural-network AI 
element which hunts for malicious traffic signatures. Should the 
AI detect malicious traffic, the AI will notify an isolation system 
which will either dynamically reconfigure the infected network 
segment via SDN, or undergo automatic VM relocation 
placement. The SDN network is being developed around 
OpenFlow protocols supported by Open vSwitch. 
4) Support both NetFlow and IPFIX export 
One function of the test bed will be to compare NetFlow 
against IPFIX functionality. As such, the system has to be 
capable of supporting both. Juniper is one of the few hardware 
vendors who support both NetFlow and IPFIX. Citrix’s 
AppFlow supports IPFIX and Huawei only support NetFlow. 
Cisco supports NetFlow on all of its hardware products, and is 
starting to increase support for IPFIX. As the environment 
replicates a CSP, virtual switches will be utilised. One of the few 
virtual switches that supports both NetFlow and IPFIX export is 
Open vSwitch (OVS) [16]. OVS has the added benefits of 
pairing well with Xen Hypervisor, is supported in OpenStack 
and Apache CloudStack, whilst being open source.  
IV. FLOW MONITORING ARCHITECTURE  
Malware attacks on virtual environments can be categorised 
[18] as: 
1) Intra-VM Attacks 
 Cross VM Side-Channel Attacks where malware gains 
information about a neighbouring VM via information 
leakage through convert signalling channels [19] [20] 
 VM Hopping allows malware to jump to another VM on 
the same host [21] [22] 
2) Inter-VM Attacks 
 VM Hyper-jacking where a rogue module, such as a 
compromised hypervisor, is inserted between the 
physical hardware and machine operating system 
allowing an attacker to control the virtual machines on 
that host [23] 
 Guest VM Escape allows malware to escape from the 
guest VM onto the host operating system. Typically the 
host has root privilege, thereby allowing the malware 
access to other virtual machines or the network [21]. 
Cloudburst [4] and Venom [17] were both capable of 
VM Escape 
 Host Escape allows malware to jump from the host 
operating system into a guest VM. Crisis malware 
(OSX.Crisis / W32.Crisis) [3] in 2012 was the first 
known malware to do this 
The flow monitoring process is a complete chain of events 
comprising of four stages: packet observation, flow export, data 
collection and data analysis [5]. 
A. Packet Observation & Flow Export 
The correct citing of flow exporters to detect attacks on 
virtual environments is important, as all exporters tested for the 
architecture did not support capture data in promiscuous mode. 
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This meant that to detect intra-VM attacks, an observation point 
is required within the tenant’s virtual environment. This will not 
be possible within CSP networks due to tenant privacy 
expectations. Exporters located in the LAN, for example a 
hardware exporter on a switch, can detect traffic destined for that 
switch port, but are blind to intra-VM attacks and requires an 
observation point on each LAN segment. Likewise, for a 
software exporter cited on a server. This would capture traffic 
between VMs distributed across that server, but would also miss 
intra-VM communication.  
All possible locations to cite an exporter were evaluated to 
understand the visibility at each collection point. It was found 
that an exporter cited on a hypervisor would export both intra-
VM and inter-VM traffic providing maximum traffic visibility 
for the least number of probes (see figure 1). This does however 
necessitate an exporter on each server under observation. 
B. Data Collection & Data Analysis 
Even on a simple test infrastructure, a flow exporter located 
on each hypervisor captures a considerable amount of traffic. 
When flow capture is compared with PCAP traffic capture, flow 
captures exactly the same information as PCAP, minus payload, 
albeit with a considerably reduced cost of data storage. Under 
test conditions a 2.9GB file was transferred between two servers. 
Over this transfer period WireShark collected nearly 3.1GB of 
traffic (including both the file transfer and background network 
traffic). Similarly, IPFIX exported the same information, minus 
payload, in as little as 43KB.  
Exported data will be collected on a central server where it 
will be collated according to export time stamp. Hence, every 
IPFIX exporter needs to synchronise their internal clocks to 
ensure time stamp consistency across the monitoring 
infrastructure. As software IPFIX exporters take their timestamp 
from their parent server, NTP on the hypervisor host server can 
be used to synchronise exporter clocks. In addition, as the IPFIX 
collector takes it’s time source from the server, the internal clock 
in each VM need not be synchronised. Once collated, data 
unrelated to botnet detection will be filtered (primarily network 
layer 2 and 3 information such as ARP, IPv6, STP, broadcast 
traffic) in order to improve the performance of the analysis 
phase. Filtered flows will be collected in CSV comma delimited 
format. When viewed as a spreadsheet, the data could be filtered 
on any of the captured IEs. Source & destination IP address were 
found to be the primary fields to determine conversation, with 
other template data adding context to these conversations. 
In order to visualise botnet communication, the flow data 
will be represented as a property graph (see figure 2); where 
nodes represent IP addresses and edges represent the data flow 
relationships. Creating relationships from the IPFIX template 
data allows inter-nodal conversations to be viewed by protocol, 
port number, direction, etc. Property graphs were chosen 
primarily because graph databases provide the structure and 
ability to query relational data. However, property graphs lend 
themselves to analysis of clustered data and data correlation. 
Experiments have shown that when utilising property graphs to 
understand botnet communication, analysing the impact of 
graph deformation from removing significant nodes is more 
accurate than analysing the vertices with the most edges [33].  
Likewise, the number of edges per node can give an indication 
to P2P traffic [34]. Property graphs will be manually analysed 
for indications of botnet communication, however work is 
planned to implement a neural network-based AI to interpret the 




Fig. 1. IPFIX Probe in DOM0 
 
 
Fig. 2. Property Graph of Botnet Communication 
 
V. RESULTS: LEARNING FROM THE SYSTEM BUILD 
A. XenServer 
The conceptual framework specifies how the botnet detector 
will be built upon Xen hypervisor with Open vSwitch as the 
software switch between tenant VMs. Citrix XenServer is an 
open source project available as a free download [24]. 
XenServer 6.2.0 is a self-contained package that includes a 
Linux-based operating system (CentOS v5.5) and the Xen 
Hypervisor (v4.1.5) which provides the secure control domain 
(DOM0) on top of the underlying OS. The Xen Server 6.2.0 
package also includes Open vSwitch v1.4.6 and Citrix’s 
XenCentre; a VM management GUI based on the XAPI tool 
stack. Upon install, the self-contained package boots a simple 
install wizard which installs CentOS, Xen hypervisor, XAPI tool 
stack and Open vSwitch. A further manual installation of Citrix 
XenCentre allows the import of guest OS .iso files into a central 
repository, after which XenCentre can create and configure 
guest VMs. Using the XenCentre management GUI, XenServer 
6.2.0 provides the control for NetFlow v5 export and “Flows v 
Time” visualisation graphs. XenCentre would not support IPFIX 
collection, so an alternative IPFIX analysis tool was required. 
Open vSwitch supports IPFIX export after release v1.10. The 
upgrade to OVS v1.10 requires CentOS 5.6 i686 RPM or above. 
XenServer v1.4.6 shipped with CentOS 5.5 i386 RPM. During 
installation XenServer partitions DOM0 into 4GB partition of 
which about 3.8GBs is used by Xen hypervisor. Before any 
upgrades can be undertaken, this partition must be manually 
enlarged to 8GB with a re-installation of XenServer. Whilst it 
may be possible to upgrade CentOS 5.5 i386 to CentOS 5.6 i686, 
the limited functionality of the cut-down CentOS OS and lack of 
documentation meant CentOS refused to be upgraded beyond 
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5.5. It was therefore impossible to enable IPFIX export on the 
XenServer 6.2.0 platform. 
B. Xen Creedence 
In 2014, Xen released Creedence Alpha v6.4.94 [25] (with 
the official release called XenServer v6.5). Another self-
contained package, Creedence includes CentOS v5.10 and OVS 
v2.1.2 which supports IPFIX. Again the DOM0 is partitioned to 
4GB but can be extended to 8 GB during installation. Once this 
network was configured, OVS was set to export the IPFIX 
format. The IPFIX template was not recognised by XenCentre, 
nor several other open source collectors and commercial tools. 
WireShark confirmed that IPFIX traffic was indeed being 
exported from OVS, but the collectors were not recognising the 
flow timestamps. OVS was set to sample IPFIX at a 1:1, but 
appeared to be exporting every single flow without aggregation, 
resulting in huge amounts of flow data collected in a very short 
timeframe. All the probes trailed were able to detect OVS 
exporting NetFlow v5, NetFlow v9 or sFlow, but not IPFIX. It 
was decided to retain OVS as the vSwitch, but to install an IPFIX 
exporting probe into the hypervisor. A number of open source 
probes were tested but failed to install correctly into the 
hypervisor, possibly due to the restricted functionality of the cut 
down CentOS operating system. At this stage it was decided to 
build a bespoke cloud stack. 
C. Bespoke Build 
A clean Ubuntu 14.04 operating system was installed as the 
server OS. Into this Xen Hypervisor 4.4 64-bit [26] was installed 
as DOM0. By default this ships with the XEND toolstack which 
has limited functionality, so this was upgraded to the XAPI 
toolstack. Open vSwitch v2.0.2 was installed as the virtual 
switch. Again OVS appeared to present timestamp and 
aggregation issues with IPFIX. After testing a number of open 
source exporter probes, nTop’s nProbe [27] was found to export 
IPFIX templates from the hypervisor. OpenXenManager is the 
recommended VM management software for Xen hypervisor, 
however this proved to be buggy when creating new VMs and 
closing existing VMs. XenCentre proved a more successful 
management system but some configuration was needed to 
allow VM consoles to be viewed. Once the final configuration 
was tested and confirmed to work as expected, repeat 
installations of the framework onto new servers were taking 
almost 30 hours. Optimisation of the installation and 
configuration process of framework was undertaken such that 
the entire framework would be installed and VMs could be up 
and running within 3 hours. 
D. C&C Botnet 
Zeus is a popular malicious botnet that is typically used to 
steal banking information by man-in-the-browser, key logging 
and form grabbing. Zeus was first discovered in 2007. Despite 
its age, new active Zeus C&C servers are still being discovered 
on a daily basis [28]. One reason for the popularity of the Zeus 
bot is the easily accessible DIY construction kit, which allows 
someone with malicious intent to create, deploy and manage a 
Zeus botnet. The Zeus botnet created for this work was created 
from the Zeus crime-wave toolkit v2.0.8.9. When a device is 
infected with Zeus, the bot runs silently in the background giving 
no tell-tale signs of the compromise. As a C&C botnet, the Zeus 
bot must periodically communicate with its C&C server for 
updates, attack instructions or to report back with stolen 
information. With Zeus, this communication takes place over 
HTTP (TCP port 80). It is this communication traffic that this 
research intends to capture and analyse, in order to monitor the 
progression of Zeus across the virtual infrastructure. 
E. IPFIX Template 
Section II explained how IPFIX’s extensible IE template 
allows exportation of any layer 2 to layer 7 information in a 
standardised template compatible between vendors. Figure 3 
details the IPFIX template constructed for this architecture, in 
order to detect botnet traffic in a CSP environment. This IPFIX 
template contains 9 of the original 18 fields found in NetFlow 
v5; decreasing the PDU size from 48 bytes in NetFlow v5, to 24 
bytes, thereby increasing the efficiency of the PDU. This frees 
PDU space for the addition of extra fields which might aid in the 
detection of botnets. In this template protocol mapping, bi-flow 
direction, source MAC address & destination MAC address 
were added at a cost of 18 bytes. Bringing the IPFIX template to 
42 bytes in total compared to NetFlow v5’s 48 bytes. Study into 
creating an optimised IPFIX template specifically for botnet 
detection has started. This may take advantage of IPFIX’s ability 
to support plugins for additional IE export, such as HTTP, DNS 
and SMTP fields. 
Fig. 3. IPFIX Template 
 
F. Botnests 
Figure 4 shows a property graph of nodal communication 
across multiple ports. Figure 5 shows the same plot of nodal 
communication, but confined to HTTP (Port 80) traffic only; 
where the size of the relationship connection is proportional to 
traffic sent and received. Figure 5 shows some HTTP traffic 
back to a server, as would be expected. Figure 5 also shows PC’s 
#3, #4, #5 and #8 connecting to PC #7 via HTTP. As PC #7 is a 
standard PC rather than a server, this suggests irregular 
behaviour indicating a potential botnest hosting a C&C server. 
In this instance, PC #7 hosted the Zeus C&C, whilst #3, #4, #5 
and #8 were infected with Zeus bot executable. Further 
granularity can be added to these flows when displayed as in and 
out traffic captured using the BiFlow_Direction field. 
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Fig. 4. Property graph of all flows 
 
 
Fig. 5. Property graph of HTTP only flows 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 The template in figure 3 was constructed by exporting Zeus 
botnet data over the LAN and VM infrastructure and selecting 
IE fields that either a) changed between malicious and benign 
traffic, or b) would provide a useful pointer to indicate malicious 
traffic. Testing is underway to create a template that contains 
fields that are optimal for detecting a range of botnet malware, 
which can be fed into a detection algorithm. One build criteria 
for this architecture was to mimic the privacy requirements 
found within CSP networks, and thereby assuming that data 
from within the payload would not be available to such a 
detection algorithm. A challenge in flow-based detection is 
obtaining sufficient characteristic data from the packet header. 
Whilst discarding the payload is well-suited for privacy 
preservation, it comes at a cost. Namely that many 
distinguishing malware characteristics are hidden in the payload, 
such as HTTP URL and HTTP POST/GET information. Many 
IPFIX collectors support extension plug-ins that are able to 
capture payload information. Testing has shown that it is 
possible to export bot characteristic data such as HTTP and DNS 
information using IPFIX extensions. In turn, this raises the 
question of where privacy starts and ends, and whether it is 
acceptable to sacrifice some degree of privacy in order to detect 
malicious activity. Further testing needs to be undertaken to 
establish the minimum set of payload data required for botnet 
detection, and how payload encryption impacts such detection 
mechanisms. 
 Section II highlights the protocol transport features and 
security mechanisms built into the IPFIX standard in order to 
preserve and protect the data flows between exporter and 
collector. These include congestion awareness protocols such as 
SCTP to protect against DoS attacks, and packet obfuscation to 
protect against flow tampering and MITM attacks. In any 
detector-based system, the detectors themselves present an 
attack surface. Whilst this architecture provides partial 
protection for the probes from their citing outside of the virtual 
environment, a mechanism is needed to protect the detection 
system from attack from the LAN, or from malware escaping the 
virtual environment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Botnet detection using NetFlow protocol is an established 
concept. Since the ratification of IPFIX as a standard in 2013 
academic study has begun to evaluate IPFIX against NetFlow. 
No academic work could be found that harnesses IPFIX for 
botnet detection. Several papers claim to do this, but upon closer 
inspection use proprietary NetFlow v9. This paper contributes to 
the state of the art by being the first to develop a flow-based 
IPFIX export framework for use in the academic study of 
virtualised environments.  
This framework was designed specifically for application 
within cloud provider and virtual environment networks, but is 
flexible enough to be applied to any LAN environment detection 
system. As the system is built upon flow export, rather than 
packet inspection, it is not impacted by payload encryption 
techniques used by botnets for detection evasion. This 
framework meets the build criteria as follows: 
1) Replicate cloud provider virtualised environments 
Xen Hypervisor and Open vSwitch were used to replicate 
cloud provider virtualised environments. Locating the flow 
export element within the hypervisor allows collection of intra-
VM and inter-VM traffic. This study came across obstacles 
when trying to utilise the XenServer eco-system for IPFIX 
capture in virtual environments, choosing to replace some of the 
elements of the XenServer stack. Table 1 summaries this 
framework and draws comparisons against the XenServer eco-
system for capture and display of traffic communication.  In 
August 2015, XenServer underwent an upgrade to bring the 
CentOS operating system up to current specifications. It will be 
interesting to understand whether the update removes some of 
the obstacles encountered in this study. 
2) Utilise currently available open source solutions 
This was achieved with the exception of nProbe. nProbe is 
not strictly open source, but code can be made available to 
research institutions upon request. Additionally, plugins can be 
constructed for nProbe that extend the IE template. This 
framework has been constructed to allow alternative probes or 
collectors to be inserted in place of nProbe. The suitability of 
alternative exporters, such as YAF [32], is being studied. Further 
work is needed to understand why Open vSwitch was not 
exporting IPFIX timestamps that could be recognised by other 
collectors and why Open vSwitch was not aggregating IPFIX 
flows. Overcoming these issues and designing Open vSwitch to 
support extensible IE template customisation may simplify the 
framework by enabling the vSwitch to become the flow 
export/collection element. 
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3) Feed into a neural network analysis element 
The aim of this framework is to become the data collection 
mechanism for part of a larger eco-system for botnet 
neutralisation within cloud environments. The output data from 
the exporter is currently converted to CSV format before being 
filtered and collated in Python, then exported to Neo4j for 
display and manual analysis. Further work is needed to 
customise the collector output data to form the input mechanism 
to a neural network detection system capable of dynamically 
determining botnet traffic profiles from background network 
traffic, before feeding into a containment mechanism. 
4) Support both IPFIX and NetFlow export 
NetFlow v5 exports a fixed template of 18 fields. Whilst 
these fields are sufficient for capture of network management 
data, IPFIX (and proprietary NetFlow v9) was designed to allow 
customisation of the template to capture additional criteria for 
new applications, such as malware detection. This framework 
permits export of both NetFlow v5 and v9 as well as IPFIX. 
Furthermore, the exporter (and vSwitch) utilised can 
additionally export sFlow and support port mirroring should 
academic study of these against IPFIX warrant. This work 
devised a simple IPFIX template (see figure 3) that exports 
sufficient information to confirm the presence of C&C botnet 
traffic. Further work is required to design an IPFIX template that 
is optimised for botnet detection. This may include additional 
exporter plugins to capture characteristics of the botnets under 
test, and should be designed for detection of C&C, P2P and IRC 
botnets. Within a CSP, such a template not only needs to respect 
tenant privacy, but the template size should be kept to a 
minimum due to the large number of flows captured over high-
speed multi-gigabit environments; thereby reducing storage 
requirements and improving analysis performance. 
CSPs are a crucial building block in the IoT, providing 
centralised storage and accessibility of IoT data. As the 
“intelligence” of more IoT devices is migrated into the cloud, 
dumb endpoints will further reduce the cost of the IoT [35]. As 
CSP infrastructure is built around virtualised architectures, 
citing malware detection mechanisms within tenant 
architectures is difficult if tenant privacy is to be respected. This 
work demonstrates how flow export detection systems 
overcome these restrictions by allowing detection functions to 
be located upon a hypervisor to capture both intra-VM and inter-
VM traffic without packet inspection. Now that the IETF has 
ratified IPFIX as a fully workable standard, flow solutions based 
upon IPFIX are starting to emerge. As more vendors support 
                                                        
1 Open vSwitch will export NetFlow v9, but XenCentre collects this a NetFlow v5 
IPFIX, CSPs will replace their NetFlow based network 
management solutions with IPFIX capable next generation 
networking technology. This standards based approach to flow 
export allows vendor neutrality and, over time, IPFIX will 
overtake NetFlow to become the prevalent protocol. This work 
demonstrates that open source IPFIX technology is of sufficient 
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